In a prediction market, agents trade assets whose value is tied to a future event, for example the outcome of the next presidential election. Asset prices determine a probability distribution over the set of possible outcomes. Typically, the outcome space is small, allowing agents to directly trade in each outcome, and allowing a market maker to explicitly update asset prices. Combinatorial markets, in contrast, work to estimate a full joint distribution of dependent observations, in which case the outcome space grows exponentially. In this paper, we consider the problem of pricing combinatorial markets for single-elimination tournaments. With n competing teams, the outcome space is of size 2 n−1 . We show that the general pricing problem for tournaments is #P-hard. We derive a polynomial-time algorithm for a restricted betting language based on a Bayesian network representation of the probability distribution. The language is fairly natural in the context of tournaments, allowing for example bets of the form "team i wins game k". We believe that our betting language is the first for combinatorial market makers that is both useful and tractable. We briefly discuss a heuristic approximation technique for the general case.
INTRODUCTION
Every year in the NCAA Mens College Basketball playoff, 64 teams play in a single-elimination tournament known as "March Madness". In the first round, the 64 teams are paired into 32 games. The 32 first-round winners are then paired into 16 games in the second round, and so on, until one team emerges the winner of the championship game in the sixth and final round. There are 63 total games each with two outcomes and thus 2 63 possible ways the tournament might unfold.
Millions of people try to predict the outcome of the tournament before it starts. Common office pool predictions take the form of categorical 0/1 statements of who will win in each of the 63 games. Las Vegas bookmakers and stock market style betting exchanges allow more informative probabilistic predictions. In fact, studies show that betting markets and related prediction markets, designed to forecast everything from elections to flu outbreaks, yield remarkably accurate probability estimates [1, 4, 12, 14, 15] . Even so, bets are typically limited to a relatively small number of predefined outcomes, for example the 32 opening round games and the championship game. Moreover, bets are managed independently so that, for example, a large bet on Duke to win the championship does not automatically update the odds of Duke winning in the first round.
We consider algorithms for implicitly maintaining a marketbased probability distribution across all 2 n−1 outcomes in an n team single-elimination tournament. In principle, this allows for betting on any of the 2 2 n−1 possible properties of the tournament outcome, for example "Duke advances further than UNC", or "At least one of the top four teams loses in the first round". With a centralized market maker, information automatically propagates properly when logic dictates, for example ensuring that the probability of Duke advancing to round three is never greater than their probability of advancing to round two.
We show that the general pricing problem for tournaments is #P-hard. We then identify a restricted betting language that forms a tractable special case. We believe that the language is natural and useful, and the first such language for a combinatorial market maker. In our betting language, agents may buy and sell assets of the form "team i wins game k", and may also trade in conditional assets of the form "team i wins game k given that they reach that game" and "team i beats team j given that they face off". Although these are arguably natural bets to place, the expressiveness of the language has the surprising side effect of introducing dependencies between games which we would naively think to be independent. For example, it is possible in this language to have a market distribution in which the winners of first round games are not independent of one another. This phenomenon relates to results on the impossibility of preserving independence in an aggregate distribution [6, 13] . We show that the usual independence relationships are restored if we only permit bets of the form "team i beats team j given that they face off".
To prove our results, we represent market distributions as Bayesian networks, a well-studied structure for representing probability distributions. In typical applications, queries are made to the network to compute conditional probabilities under a fixed distribution. It is interesting to note that our algorithm uses the results of these queries to iteratively update the Bayesian network itself so as to mirror the evolving market distribution. A surprising feature of our representation is that network edges are necessarily oriented in the opposite direction suggested by the usual understanding of causality in tournaments. For example, instead of conditioning the distribution of second round games on the results of first round games, we condition on the results of third round games.
Related Work. Prior work on combinatorial markets has primarily focused on call market exchanges, in which agents place orders for assets, and the clearing problem is to risklessly match these orders between agents. Fortnow et al. [5] analyze, the computational complexity of Booleanstyle betting, where the underlying outcome space is binary n-tuples and agents are allowed to bet on sets described by Boolean formulas. They show that for divisible orders the matching problem is co-NP-complete, and is P p 2 -complete for indivisible orders. Indivisible order matching is hard even when bets are restricted to conjunctions of only two literals. Chen et al. [3] analyze two languages for betting on permutations-pair betting and subset betting. A pair bet is a bet on one candidate to finish ahead of another, e.g., "candidate A beats candidate B". Subset bets come in two forms: position-subset bets and candidate-subset bets. A position-subset bet is a bet on a single candidate to finish in a subset of positions, e.g., "candidate A finishes in position 1, 2, or 5"; a candidate-subset bet is a bet on a subset of candidates to finish in a single position, e.g., "candidate A, B, or D finishes in position 2". They show that subset betting is tractable while pair betting is not. Chen et al. [2] 's unpublished work relates most closely to our own. In both the Boolean and permutation market maker settings, they identify some very restrictive languages that remain #P-hard. They also propose an approximation algorithm for a permutation market maker.
Asset prices in the markets we analyze are determined by Hanson's logarithmic market scoring rule market maker [8] , which has several advantages over call market designs. Agents trade with the market maker, who sets asset prices and who accepts all buy and sell orders at these prices. In particular, market makers help reduce both the thin market and irrational participation problems that affect stock market style exchanges. The thin market problem arises when agents have to coordinate which assets they will trade with each other, as is the case in call markets. The liquidity added by a market maker is especially important in supporting the large number of bet types typical in the combinatorial setting. In zero-sum games, 'no-trade' theorems [10] state that rational agents, after hedging their risks, will no longer trade with each other, even when they hold private information. Market-makers avoid this irrational participation issue by, in essence, subsidizing the market.
Our paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we review the general framework of prediction markets and discuss Bayesian networks. In Section 3 we derive our main result, a polynomial-time algorithm to price combinatorial markets for single-elimination tournaments. Appendix A presents a heuristic approximation scheme for the general, #P-hard, problem of pricing combinatorial markets. The proofs of some of our results have been placed in Appendix B.
PRELIMINARIES

Prediction Markets
Prediction markets are speculative markets designed to elicit forecasts. Because the goal is to gather information, an automated market maker that expects to lose a small and bounded amount of money on average may actually help attract informed traders. In the next subsection, we describe the most common such market maker mechanism.
Market Scoring Rule Market Maker
A market scoring rule maintains a probability distribution over an outcome space Ω which reflects a consensus estimate of the likelihood of any event. Market scoring rules may be implemented as market-maker driven exchanges in which traders buy and sell securities of the form "Pays $1 if ω occurs". All transaction costs are paid to a market-maker who agrees to honor the contracts. Let q : Ω → R indicate the number of outstanding shares on each state. If a trader wishes to change the number of outstanding shares from q tõ q, i.e., wants to buy or sell shares, the cost of the transaction under the logarithmic market scoring rule [8] is C(q) − C(q) where
The parmeter b is the liquidity, or depth, of the market. When b is large, it becomes more expensive for any particular agent to move the market distribution. If there are q outstanding shares, the spot price for shares on a given outcome ω is
which is interpreted as the aggregate, market-generated probability estimate for ω.
Moving outstanding shares from q toq results in a (statedependent) net pay out to the agent of
In other words, for moving the prices from Pq to Pq, an agent receives payment b log Pq in exchange for agreeing to pay the last agent who interacted with the market. The market-maker opens the market with an initial distribution of shares on states (e.g. q0 ≡ 0). If the market closes with a distribution of sharesq, the market-maker makes a net payment to traders of
In particular, for q0 ≡ 0, the market-maker's maximum loss is bounded by b log |Ω|.
Securities for Conditional Events
For an event A ⊂ Ω, to construct the security "Pays $1 if A occurs," a trader purchases one share on each outcome ω ∈ A. Traders may also desire conditional securities of the form "Pays $1 if A occurs, conditional on B occurring." If the condition B does not occur, then the transaction should be effectively voided. To construct this asset, traders buy shares of AB and short sell shares ofĀB for zero net payment (but assume liability inĀB). In this way, if B does not occur, the trader is not paid for AB, and does not have to cover shares inĀB. Otherwise, assuming B occurs, she is paid depending on whether A happens. Specifically, to simulate buying ∆ shares of the security A|B, the agent buys
shares of AB, and short sells
shares ofĀB. Lemma B.1 shows that this transaction requires zero net payment. IfĀB occurs, the agent has to cover the shares she sold short, for a loss of dollars equal to (2), since each share pays $1. In order to avoid extending credit to agents, the market-maker asks the agent to pay this potential loss up front, which is returned ifĀB does not occur. Then, if AB occurs, the agent receives:
IfĀB occurs, the agent receives nothing; and if B does not occur, the agent is returned her deposit of
Bayesian Networks
A Bayesian network (or a belief network) is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of variables and their probabilistic dependencies. Formally, a Bayesian network is a directed graph with labeled nodes corresponding to random variables X1, . . . , Xn, and edges drawn from lower to higher numbered nodes (see, e.g., Figures 1 and 2 ). The parents of a node Xi are those nodes that point to Xi. Given a joint distribution P (X1 = x1, . . . , Xn = xn) on the nodes, a Bayesian network is a representation of P if
These conditional probabilities, together with the structure of the Bayesian network, completely determine P . Namely,
Although the Bayesian network completely specifies a distribution, in general it is NP-hard to compute, e.g., marginal probabilities P (Xi = xi). For certain network topologies, however, there exist efficient algorithms to compute both marginal and conditional distributions [11, 16] . In particular, for pricing tournaments, we rely on the fact that one can perform these computations on trees in time linear in the number of nodes.
PRICING COMBINATORIAL MARKETS FOR TOURNAMENTS
In Section 3.1 we present an elementary argument that the general pricing problem for tournaments is #P-hard. Given this difficulty, in Section 3.2 we derive a polynomial-time pricing algorithm by appropriately restricting to a natural betting language. The expressiveness of this language has the side effect of introducing dependencies between games which we would naively think to be independent, a phenomenon related to results on the impossibility of preserving independence in an aggregate distribution [6, 13] . In Section 3.3 we show that the usual independence relationships are restored if we further restrict the language.
Computational Complexity
The outcome space Ω for tournaments with n teams can be represented as the set of binary vectors of length n−1, where each coordinate denotes whether the winner of a game came from the left branch or the right branch of the tournament tree. Then |Ω| = 2 n−1 and, in the most general version of the pricing problem, agents are allowed to bet on any of the 2 2 n−1 subsets of Ω. The pricing problem is #P-hard, even under certain restrictions on the betting language.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that there are no outstanding shares when the tournament market opens, and let φ be a Boolean formula. For S φ = {ω : ω satisfies φ},
where c is the cost of purchasing 1 share of S φ and b is the liquidity parameter.
Proof. The cost of the transaction is
and the result follows from solving for |S φ |.
Corollary 3.1. Suppose agents are allowed to place bets on sets S φ where φ is a monotone 2-CNF, i.e., φ = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cr and ci is the disjunction of 2 non-negated literals. Then the pricing problem restricted to this betting language is #P-hard.
Proof. The result follows from the fact that monotone #2-SAT is #P-complete [17] .
A Tractable Betting Language
Given that the general pricing problem is #P-hard, we restrict the types of bets agents are allowed to place. Here we show how to support bets of the form "team i wins game k", "team i wins game k given that they make it to that game" and "team i beats team j given they face off." The key observation for pricing these assets is that bets in this language preserve the Bayesian network structure depicted in Figure 1 , in which edges are directed away from the final game of the tournament. Surprisingly, these bets do not preserve the Bayesian structure corresponding to the usual understanding of causality in tournaments, in which arrows are reversed (see Figure 2 ). We start with some preliminary results. Lemma 3.2 and Corollary 3.2 show how, in an arbitrary market, probabilities are updated as the result of buying shares on an event. Lemma 3.3 shows how to simplify certain conditional probabilities for a Bayesian network structured as in Figure 1 .
Lemma 3.2. Suppose ∆b shares are purchased for the event A, where b is the liquidity parameter. Let P denote the distribution on Ω before the shares are purchased, and letP denote the distribution after the purchase. Then for any event B ⊂ Ω we havẽ
Proof. We use the notation qω to indicate the number of shares on outcome ω before the purchase, andqω for the number of shares after the purchase. Observe that
e ∆ P (AB) + P (ĀB) .
Now, sinceP (B) = [P (B)/P (B)]/[1+P (B)/P (B)], we havẽ
Corollary 3.2. Suppose ∆b shares are purchased for the event A, where b is the liquidity parameter. Let P denote the distribution on Ω before the shares were purchased, and letP denote the distribution after the purchase. Then for any events B, C ⊂ Ω we havẽ
Proof. The result follows from a Lemma 3.2 by writing P (B|C) =P (BC)/P (C).
Lemma 3.3. Consider a probability distribution P represented as a Bayesian network on a binary tree with arrows pointing away from the root and nodes labeled as in Figure 1 . Select a node Xi with i > 1, and for m < i, let Xi,m be the highest numbered node in {X1, . . . , Xm} that lies along the unique path from the root to Xi. Then,
Proof. Let Xi 0 , Xi 1 , . . . , Xi k denote the path from Xi up to Xi,m, i.e. Xi 0 = Xi, Xi k = Xi,m and Xi j is the parent of Xi j−1 . By induction on k, the length of the path, we show
For k = 1, P (Xi = xi|X1, . . . Xm) = P (Xi = xi|Xi 1 ), since i1 ≤ m and, by the Bayesian network assumption, Xi is conditionally independent of its predecessors given its parent. For the inductive step, observe that
The result follows by applying the induction hypothesis to P (Xi 1 = xi 1 |X1, . . . , Xm).
Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.3 show that bets on game winners preserve the Bayesian network structure, and, importantly, how to update the distribution. Theorem 3.1. Suppose P is represented as a Bayesian network on a binary tree with nodes numbered as in Figure 1 and arrows pointing away from the root. Consider a market order O = (gj, tj, ∆b), interpreted as buying ∆b shares on outcomes in which team tj wins game gj. Then the distributionP that results from executing the order is also represented by a Bayesian network with the same structure, and only the distributions of gj and its ancestors are affected. Furthermore, the uniform distribution P0, corresponding to 0 shares on each outcome, is represented by the Bayesian network.
Proof. Each node Xi, excepting the root, has a unique parent which we callXi. We start by considering the uniform distribution P0. Let D(Xi) be the domain of Xi, i.e. D(Xi) = {t : {Xi = t} = ∅}. Observe that for each non-root node
showing that P0 is represented by the Bayesian network. Now we consider the case of updating. Set A = {Xg j = tj}, B = {Xi = xi} where Xi is a non-root node, C = {X1 = x1, . . . , Xi−1 = xi−1} for some configuration (x1, . . . , xi−1), andĈ = {Xi =xi} wherexi is the value ofXi in C. Corollary 3.2 shows that
where the last equality follows from the Bayesian network assumption. Consider the following cases:
1. gj < i: Then, P (A|BC) = P (A|C), and consequently, P (B|C) = P (B|Ĉ).
2. gj = i: Then, P (A|BC) = P (A|B), and sõ
e ∆ P (A|Ĉ) + P (Ā|Ĉ) # .
gj > i:
In this case, Lemma 3.3 shows that
If Xg j is a descendent of Xi, then Xg j ,i = Xi, and P (A|BC) = P (A|B), showing that
Otherwise, if Xg j is not a descendent of Xi, then Xg j ,i ∈ {X1, . . . , Xi−1}
and hence P (A|BC) = P (A|C). In this case,P (B|C) = P (B|Ĉ).
In all three cases, we have thatP (B|C) depends only on the value ofXi and, in fact, only the distributions of gj and its ancestors change, proving the result.
Corollary 3.3. Consider the setting of Theorem 3.1. The Bayesian network representingP is constructed from the Bayesian network representing P as follows: For Xg j and each of its ancestors, update the conditional probabilities according tõ
assuming Xi is not the root. Update the (unconditional) distribution of the root bỹ
The conditional distribution for all other nodes remain the same.
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 3.1, Lemma 3.2 and Corollary 3.2
Above we showed how to update the market-based distribution on Ω as a result of market transactions. Lemma 3.4 shows how to compute the price of such a transaction.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose ∆b shares are purchased for the event A, and let P denote the distribution on Ω before the shares are purchased. Then the cost of the purchase is
To support conditional bets, we first show how to support bets in which agents pick the winners of two games, one of which is the parent game of the other. By combining these securities, one can construct the conditional assets as well.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose P is represented as a Bayesian network on a binary tree with nodes numbered as in Figure 1 and arrows pointing away from the root. Consider a market order O = (gj 1 , tj 1 , gj 2 , tj 2 , ∆b), interpreted as buying ∆b shares on outcomes in which team tj i wins game gj i , where gj 1 is the parent of gj 2 . Then the distributionP that results from executing the order is also represented by a Bayesian network with the same structure, and only the distributions of gj 2 and its ancestors are affected.
Proof. Each node Xi, excepting the root, has a unique parent which we callXi. Set A = {Xg j 1 = tj 1 , Xg j 2 = tj 2 }, B = {Xi = xi} where Xi is a non-root node, C = {X1 = x1, . . . , Xi−1 = xi−1} for some configuration (x1, . . . , xi−1), andĈ = {Xi =xi} wherexi is the value ofXi in C. Corollary 3.2 shows that
where the last equality follows from the Bayesian network assumption on P . Consider the following cases:
1. gj 2 < i: Then, P (A|BC) = P (A|C), and consequently, P (B|C) = P (B|Ĉ).
2. gj 2 = i: Then, P (A|BC) = P (A|BĈ), and sõ
3. gj 1 < i < gj 2 : Set A1 = {Xg j 1 = tj 1 } and A2 = {Xg j 2 = tj 2 }. If A1 ∩ C = ∅, then P (A|BC) = 0 = P (A|C). Otherwise, by Lemma 3.3,
Consequently,P (B|C) = P (B|Ĉ).
4. gj 1 = i: In this case, again using Lemma 3.3, P (A|BC) = P (A|B). So,
gj 1 > i:
Using the notation of Lemma 3.3, P (A|BC) = P (A|Xg j 1 ,i). If Xg j 1 is a descendent of Xi, then
Fand P (A|BC) = P (A|B), showing that
Otherwise, if Xg j 1 is not a descendent of Xi, then Xg j 1 ,i ∈ {X1, . . . , Xi−1}, and hence
In this case,P (B|C) = P (B|Ĉ).
In all five cases, we have thatP (B|C) depends only on the value ofXi and, in fact, only the distributions of gj 2 and its ancestors change, proving the result.
Corollary 3.4. Consider the setting of Theorem 3.2. The Bayesian network representingP is constructed from the Bayesian network representing P as follows: For Xg j 2 and each of its ancestors, update the conditional probabilities according tõ
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 3.2, Lemma 3.2 and Corollary 3.2
To construct the conditional asset A|B, agents buy AB and short sellĀB according to (1) and (2) . In particular, to simulate "team i wins game k given that they make it to that game", set A = {X k = i} and B = {Xj = i} where Xj is the child of X k for which B = ∅. Theorem 3.2 directly shows how to update the Bayesian network after trading in AB. To executeĀB, one can trade, in sequence, the assets A1B, A2B, . . . , Ai−1B, Ai+1B, . . . , AnB, where A l = {X k = l}. Now, Theorem 3.2 shows that each trade in A l B preserves the Bayesian network, and furthermore, only the distributions of Xj and its ancestors are affected. Finally, knowing thatĀB preserves the network and that only Xj and its ancestors are affected, one need not actually trade each A l B, but rather, may directly update the relevant distributions by appealing to Lemma 3.2 and Corollary 3.2.
Corollary 3.5. Suppose P is represented as a Bayesian network on a binary tree with nodes numbered as in Figure 1 and arrows pointing away from the root. Set A = {X k = i} and B = {Xj = i} where Xj is the child of X k for which B = ∅. Then the distributionP that results from buying ∆b shares onĀB is still represented by a Bayesian network with the same structure. Moreover, only the distributions of Xj and its ancestors are affected, and are updated as follows:
assuming X l is not the root. Update the (unconditional) distribution of the root bỹ
To construct the conditional asset "team i beats team j given that they face off" observe that there is a unique game k in which i and j could potentially play each other. Set A = {X k = i} and B = {Xj 1 = i, Xj 2 = j} where Xj 1 and Xj 2 are the children of X k ordered such that B = ∅. Now AB = {X k = i, Xj 2 = j} andĀB = {X k = j, Xj 1 = i}. Theorem 3.2 allows agents to trade in both of these joint events, and they can consequently construct the conditional asset.
The price the market maker charges agents for buying these conditional assets is discussed in Section 2.1.2. Namely, the cost for purchasing ∆b shares of A|B is
Then, if AB occurs, the agent receive ∆b dollars; ifĀB occurs, the agent receives nothing; and if B does not occur, the agent is returned the cost of the purchase.
Theorem 3.3. For n teams, O(n 3 ) operations are needed to update the Bayesian network as a result of trading assets of the form "team i wins game k", "team i wins game k given that they make it to that game" and "team i beats team j given they face off."
Proof. Each node in the k th generation may take n/2 k values with positive probability, where we set k = 0 for the root. The root maintains n marginal probabilities P (X1 = xi). Each node in generation k > 0 maintains a conditional distribution P ( · |Xi =xi) for each of the n/2
valuesxi its parent could take. Ifxi is in the domain of Xi, then P (Xi =xi|Xi =xi) = 1. Otherwise, specifying the conditional distribution of Xi|Xi =xi requires knowing P (Xi = xi|Xi =xi) for each xi in the domain of Xi. Consequently, Xi maintains n/2 k · n/2 k = n 2 /4 k parameters. Trading in either conditional or unconditional assets affects the distribution of at most one node in each generation, and consequently changes O(n 2 ) parameters. Since queries required to update the Bayesian network can be executed in time linear in the number of nodes [16] , the total execution time for a trade is O(n 3 ).
Betting on matchup winners
The betting language discussed in Section 3.2 can lead to unexpected dependencies in the market-derived distribution. We illustrate this phenomenon with a simple example. Suppose there are four teams {T1, . . . , T4}, so that the tournament consists of three games {X1, X2, X3}, where X2 and X3 are the first round games, and X1 is the final game. The state space Ω has eight outcomes
where each coordinate indicates which team won the corresponding game.
Suppose we start with no outstanding shares, and are to execute two bets: "∆b shares on team 1 to win game 3" and "∆b shares on team 3 to win game 3". After executing these bets, outcomes ω1, ω2, ω3 and ω6 each have ∆b shares, and the other outcomes have 0 shares. Now,
and P (X1 = 1, X2 = 3) = 2e ∆ /(4e ∆ + 4). In particular, since P (X1 = 1)P (X2 = 3) = P (X1 = 1, X2 = 3), X1 and X2 are not independent.
Here we further restrict the betting language of Section 3.2 so as to preserve the usual independence relations. The language allows only bets of the form "team i beats team j given that they face off." These bets preserve the Bayesian network structure shown in Figure 2 . Notably, the edges in the network are directed toward the final game of the tournament, in constrast to the Bayesian network representing our more expressive language. In particular, the conditional distribution of a game Xj given all previous games depends only on the two gamesX L j andX R j directly leading up to Xj, as one might ordinarily expect to be the case.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose P is represented as a Bayesian network on a binary tree with nodes numbered as in Figure 2 and arrows pointing toward the root. Consider a market order O = (gj, tj, t j , ∆b), interpreted as buying ∆b shares on outcomes in which team tj wins game gj, conditional on tj and t j playing in game gj. Then the distributionP that results from executing the order is also represented by a Bayesian network with the same structure, and only the Figure 2 : A Bayesian network for a tournament. Nodes represent game winners, and edges are oriented in accordance with the usual interpretation of causality.
distribution of gj is affected. Furthermore, the uniform distribution P0, corresponding to 0 shares on each outcome, is represented by the Bayesian network. 
e ∆ P (A|B) + P (Ā|B) (and setP (Ā|B) = 1 −P (A|B)). All other conditional probabilities remain unchanged.
Every pair of teams play each other in at most one game, namely in the game that is their nearest common descendent in the tournament tree. Corollary 3.6 shows that one can think of this betting language as maintaining`n 2´i ndependent markets, one for each pair of teams, where each market gives an estimate of a particular team winning given they face off. Although bets in one market do not affect prices in any other market, they do effect the global distribution on Ω. In particular, the distribution on Ω is constructed from the independent markets via the Bayesian network.
Since each trade in this language requires updating only a single parameter of the Bayesian network, and since that update can be performed in O(n) steps [16] , the execution time for trades is linear in the number of teams. estimator
where Xi ∼ µ, i.e. Xi are draws from µ. In practice, it is useful to apply the asymptotically unbiased estimator
The considerable advantage of (3) is that the importance weights Pq(Xi)/µ(Xi) only need to be known up to a constant. For example, suppose we are able to draw uniformly from Ω, i.e. µ(ω) = 1/N where |Ω| = N . Then the importance weights satisfy
for a constant Z. In particular, (3) simplifies tô
In the above, we assumed µ to be uniform over Ω. In some cases, it may be possible to make draws from Ω according to
where Z is the total number of shares on Ω. Each market order Oi = (Ai, si) consists of an event Ai and the number of shares si to buy on that event. Suppose that for each set corresponding to an order, we can compute its size ni and are able to choose an outcome from Ai uniformly at random. Choose an outcome from Ω as follows:
1. Select an order Oi at random proportional to nisi.
2. Select an outcome from Oi at random.
Lemma A.1. The sampling procedure above generates a draw from Ω according to the distribution µ(ω) ∝ qω.
Proof. For any outcome ω, consider the orders Oi 1 , . . . , Oi m such that ω ∈ Ai j , i.e. orders where shares were purchased on ω. The number of shares on ω is then si 1 
where Z is the total number of shares on Ω.
For µ(ω) ∝ qω and Xi ∼ µ, we have the estimator shares ofĀB.
Proof. Lettingq denote the new distribution of shares, the cost of the transaction is
, and hence,
Proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof. The cost function for the logarithmic market scoring rule is C(q) = b log " P w∈Ω e qω /b " . Lettingq denote the number of shares on each state after the new shares are purchased, we have
We use the notation A ⊥B C to indicate that A and C are conditionally independent given B. That is, P (A|BC) = P (A|B).
Lemma B.2. For events A and B, suppose shares are purchased on the conditional event A|B. Let P denote the distribution on Ω before the shares were purchased, and letP denote the distribution after the purchase. Then the following hold:
where the conditional independence statements are with respect to P .
Proof. Note that there exist c1, c2 such thatP (ω) = c1P (ω) for ω ∈ AB, andP (ω) = c2P (ω) for ω ∈ĀB. Furthermore,P (ω) = P (ω) for ω ∈ B, andP (B) = P (B). We use the convention that, for any set S, P (S|∅) = 0. Now, and hence,P (B|D) = P (B|D). Finally, from (6) we havẽ P (C|D) = P (C|BD)P (B|D) + P (C|BD)P (B|D) = P (CB|D) + P (CB|D) = P (C|D).
Proof of Theorem 3.4
Proof. Each interior (i.e., non-leaf) node Xi has exactly two parents, which we denote byX 2. gj > i: If BD = ∅, then P (A|CBD) = P (A|B) = P (A|BD). So A ⊥BD C, or BD = ∅. Also, P (A|BD) = P (A|B), so A ⊥B D. Consequently, by Lemma B.2(3), P (C|D) = P (C|D) = P (C|D). In all three cases, we have thatP (C|D) depends only onD, and furthermore, only the distribution of game i changes.
Proof of Corollary 3.6
Proof. The result follows from the construction given in the proof of Theorem 3.4, with values of c1 and c2 derived from (1) and (2) .
